THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE OF BARON DE MONTESQUIEU
INTRODUCTION
EARLY LIFE AND BACKGROUND
(1689-1755)
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU
Charles
Louis de Secondat was born in Bordeaux, France, in 1689 to a wealthy family.
Despite his family's wealth, de Decondat was placed in the care of a poor
family during his childhood. He later went to college and studied science and
history, eventually becoming a lawyer in the local government. De Secondat's
father died in 1713 and he was placed under the care of his uncle, Baron de
Montesquieu. The Baron died in 1716 and left de Secondat his fortune, his
office as president of the Bordeaux Parliament, and his title of Baron de
Montesquieu. Later he was a member of the Bordeaux and French Academies of
Science and studied the laws and customs and governments of the countries of
Europe. He gained fame in 1721 with his Persian Letters, which criticized the
lifestyle and liberties of the wealthy French as well as the church. However,
Montesquieu's book On the Spirit of Laws, published in 1748, was his most
famous work. It outlined his ideas on how government would best work. Baron de Montesquieu, French writer
and jurist. He became counselor of the Bordeaux parliament in 1714 and was its
president from 1716 to 1728. Montesquieu first became prominent as a writer
with his Persian Letters (1721; trans. 1961); in this work, through the
device of letters written to and by two aristocratic Persian travelers in
Europe, Montesquieu satirized contemporary French politics, social conditions,
ecclesiastical matters, and literature. the book won immediate and wide
popularity; it was one of the earliest works of the movement known as the
Enlightenment, which, by its criticism of French institutions under the Bourbon
monarchy, helped bring about the French Revolution. The reputation acquired by
Montesquieu through this work and several others of lesser importance led to
his election to the French Academy in 1728. His second significant work was Considérations
sur les causes de la grandeur et de la décadence des Romains (Thoughts on
the Causes of the Greatness and the Downfall of the Romans, 1734), one of the
first important works in the philosophy of history. His masterpiece was The
Spirit of Laws (1748; trans. 1750), in which he examined the three main
types of government (republic, monarchy, and despotism) and states that a
relationship does exist between an area's climate, geography, and general
circumstances and the form of government that evolves. Montesquieu also held
that governmental powers should be separated and balanced to guarantee
individual rights and freedom.
. Major Works
Montesquieu's two most important works are the Persian
Letters and The Spirit of the Laws. While these works share certain themes --
most notably a fascination with non-European societies and a horror of
despotism -- they are quite different from one another, and will be treated
separately.
.
The Persian
Letters
The Persian Letters is an epistolary novel consisting of
letters sent to and from two fictional Persians, Usbek and Rica, who set out
for Europe in 1711 and remain there at least until 1720, when the novel ends.
When Montesquieu wrote the Persian Letters, travellers' accounts of their
journeys to hitherto unknown parts of the world, and of the peculiar customs
they found there, were very popular in Europe. While Montesquieu was not the
first writer to try to imagine how European culture might look to travellers
from non-European countries, he used that device with particular brilliance.
The Spirit of the Laws
Montesquieu's aim in The Spirit of the Laws is to explain
human laws and social institutions. This might seem like an impossible project:
unlike physical laws, which are, according to Montesquieu, instituted and
sustained by God, positive laws and social institutions are created by fallible
human beings who are "subject ... to ignorance and error, [and] hurried
away by a thousand impetuous passions" (SL 1.1). One might therefore
expect our laws and institutions to be no more comprehensible than any other
catalog of human follies, an expectation which the extraordinary diversity of
laws adopted by different societies would seem to confirm.
IDEA ON LIBERTY
Montesquieu is among the greatest philosophers of
liberalism, but his is what Shklar has called "a liberalism of fear"
(Shklar, Montesquieu, p. 89). According to Montesquieu, political liberty is
"a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his
safety" (SL 11.6). Liberty is not the freedom to do whatever we want: if
we have the freedom to harm others, for instance, others will also have the
freedom to harm us, and we will have no confidence in our own safety. Liberty
involves living under laws that protect us from harm while leaving us free to
do as much as possible, and that enable us to feel the greatest possible
confidence that if we obey those laws, the power of the state will not be
directed against us. If it is to provide its citizens with the greatest
possible liberty, a government must have certain features. First, since
"constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to
abuse it ... it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should
be a check to power" (SL 11.4). This is achieved through the separation of
the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of government. If different
persons or bodies exercise these powers, then each can check the others if they
try to abuse their powers. But if one person or body holds several or all of
these powers, then nothing prevents that person or body from acting
tyrannically; and the people will have no confidence in their own security. Certain
arrangements make it easier for the three powers to check one another.
Montesquieu argues that the legislative power alone should have the power to
tax, since it can then deprive the executive of funding if the latter attempts
to impose its will arbitrarily. Likewise, the executive power should have the
right to veto acts of the legislature, and the legislature should be composed
of two houses, each of which can prevent acts of the other from becoming law.
The judiciary should be independent of both the legislature and the executive,
and should restrict itself to applying the laws to particular cases in a fixed
and consistent manner, so that "the judicial power, so terrible to
mankind, … becomes, as it were, invisible", and people "fear the office,
but not the magistrate" (SL 11.6).
Liberty also requires that the laws concern only
threats to public order and security, since such laws will protect us from harm
while leaving us free to do as many other things as possible. Thus, for
instance, the laws should not concern offenses against God, since He does not
require their protection. They should not prohibit what they do not need to
prohibit: "all punishment which is not derived from necessity is
tyrannical. The law is not a mere act of power; things in their own nature
indifferent are not within its province" (SL 19.14). The laws should be
constructed to make it as easy as possible for citizens to protect themselves
from punishment by not committing crimes. They should not be vague, since if
they were, we might never be sure whether or not some particular action was a
crime. Nor should they prohibit things we might do inadvertently, like bumping
into a statue of the emperor, or involuntarily, like doubting the wisdom of one
of his decrees; if such actions were crimes, no amount of effort to abide by
the laws of our country would justify confidence that we would succeed, and
therefore we could never feel safe from criminal prosecution. Finally, the laws
should make it as easy as possible for an innocent person to prove his or her
innocence. They should concern outward conduct, not (for instance) our thoughts
and dreams, since while we can try to prove that we did not perform some
action, we cannot prove that we never had some thought. The laws should not
criminalize conduct that is inherently hard to prove, like witchcraft; and
lawmakers should be cautious when dealing with crimes like sodomy, which are
typically not carried out in the presence of several witnesses, lest they
"open a very wide door to calumny" (SL 12.6). Montesquieu's emphasis
on the connection between liberty and the details of the criminal law were
unusual among his contemporaries, and inspired such later legal reformers as
Cesare Beccaria.
IDEA ON GENDER
Despite
Montesquieu's belief in the principles of a democracy, he did not feel that all
people were equal. Montesquieu approved of slavery. He also thought that women
were weaker than men and that they had to obey the commands of their husband.
However, he also felt that women did have the ability to govern. "It is
against reason and against nature for women to be mistresses in the house...
but not for them to govern an empire. In the first case, their weak state does
not permit them to be preeminent; in the second, their very weakness gives them
more gentleness and moderation, which, rather than the harsh and ferocious
virtues, can make for a good environment." In this way, Montesquieu argued
that women were too weak to be in control at home, but that there calmness and
gentleness would be helpful qualities in making decisions in government.
IDEA ON RELIGION
Montesquieu does not believe in any kind of divine
right such as divine enlightenment, providence, or guidance. In the Spirit of
the Laws, Montesquieu considers religions "in relation only to the good
they produce in civil society", and not to be true or false. He regards
different religions as appropriate to different environments and forms of government.
Protestantism suites republics the best, Catholicism to monarchies, and Islam
to despotisms; the Islamic prohibition on eating pork is appropriate to Arabia,
where hogs are scarce and contribute to disease, while in India, where cattle
are badly needed but do not thrive, a prohibition on eating beef is suitable.
Religion plays only a minor part in the Spirit of the
Laws. God is described in Book 1 as creating nature and its laws; having done
so, He vanishes, and plays no further explanatory role. In particular,
Montesquieu does not explain the laws of any country by appeal to divine
enlightenment, providence, or guidance. In the Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu
considers religions "in relation only to the good they produce in civil
society" (SL 24.1), and not to their truth or falsity. He regards
different religions as appropriate to different environments and forms of
government. Protestantism is most suitable to republics, Catholicism to
monarchies, and Islam to despotisms; the Islamic prohibition on eating pork is
appropriate to Arabia, where hogs are scarce and contribute to disease, while
in India, where cattle are badly needed but do not thrive, a prohibition on
eating beef is suitable. Thus, "when Montezuma with so much obstinacy
insisted that the religion of the Spaniards was good for their country, and his
for Mexico, he did not assert an absurdity" (SL 24.24).
Religion can help to ameliorate the effects of bad
laws and institutions; it is the only thing capable of serving as a check on
despotic power. However, on Montesquieu's view it is generally a mistake to
base civil laws on religious principles. Religion aims at the perfection of the
individual; civil laws aim at the welfare of society. Given these different
aims, what these two sets of laws should require will often differ; for this
reason religion "ought not always to serve as a first principle to the
civil laws" (SL 26.9). The civil laws are not an appropriate tool for
enforcing religious norms of conduct: God has His own laws, and He is quite
capable of enforcing them without our assistance. When we attempt to enforce
God's laws for Him, or to cast ourselves as His protectors, we make our
religion an instrument of fanaticism and oppression; this is a service neither
to God nor to our country.
If several religions have gained adherents in a
country, those religions should all be tolerated, not only by the state but by
its citizens. The laws should "require from the several religions, not
only that they shall not embroil the state, but that they shall not raise
disturbances among themselves" (SL 25.9). While one can try to persuade
people to change religions by offering them positive inducements to do so,
attempts to force others to convert are ineffective and inhumane. In an unusually
scathing passage, Montesquieu also argues that they are unworthy of
Christianity, and writes: "if anyone in times to come shall dare to
assert, that in the age in which we live, the people of Europe were civilized,
you (the Inquisition) will be cited to prove that they were barbarians; and the
idea they will have of you will be such as will dishonor your age, and spread
hatred over all your contemporaries" (SL 25.13).
Thus,
"when Montezuma with so much obstinacy insisted that the religion of the
Spaniards was good for their country, and his for Mexico, he did not assert an
absurdity" frequently recommended in the Gospel is incompatible with the
despotic rage with which a prince punishes his subjects, and exercises himself
in cruelty. As this religion forbids the plurality of wives, its princes are
less confined, less concealed from their subjects, and consequently have more
humanity: they are more disposed to be directed by laws, and more capable of
perceiving that they cannot do whatever they please. And while we could debate
Montesquieu's understanding of Christianity, Islam, etc., the point I am trying
to make is that Montesquieu, and the founders who quoted him, believed religion
was as indispensable to republicanism as were the separation of powers (also a
Montesquieu idea). And several of the founders actually appear to agree with
Montesquieu's belief that Christianity was the best fit for their republican
experiment: development of American republicanism.
IDEA ON SOCIETY, CLIMATE AND GEOGRAPHY
The third
major contribution of De l'esprit des lois was to the field of political
sociology, which Montesquieu is often credited with more or less inventing. The
bulk of the treatise, in fact, concerns how geography and climate interact with
particular cultures to produce the "spirit" of a people. This spirit,
in turn, inclines that people toward certain sorts of political and social
institutions, and away from others. Later writers often caricatured
Montesquieu's theory by suggesting that he claimed to explain legal variation
simply by the distance of a community from the equator.
While the analysis in De l'esprit des lois is much
more subtle than these later writers perceive, many of his specific claims
appear foolish to modern readers. Nevertheless, his approach to politics from a
naturalistic or scientific point of view proved very influential, directly or
indirectly inspiring modern fields of political science, sociology, and
anthropology. Montesquieu believed that
all things were made up of rules or laws that never changed. He set out to
study these laws scientifically with the hope that knowledge of the laws of
government would reduce the problems of society and improve human life.
According to Montesquieu, there were three types of government: a monarchy
(ruled by a king or queen), a republic (ruled by an elected leader), and a
despotism (ruled by a dictator). Montesquieu believed that a government that
was elected by the people was the best form of government. He did, however,
believe that the success of a democracy - a government in which the people have
the power - depended upon maintaining the right balance of power.
Montequieu believes that climate and geography affect
the temperaments and customs of a country's inhabitants. He is not a determinist,
and does not believe that these influences are irresistible. Nonetheless, he
believes that the laws should take these effects into account, accommodating
them when necessary, and counteracting their worst effects. According to
Montesquieu, a cold climate constricts our bodies' fibers, and causes coarser
juices to flow through them. Heat, by contrast, expands our fibers, and
produces more rarefied juices. These physiological changes affect our
characters. Those who live in cold climates are vigorous and bold, phlegmatic,
frank, and not given to suspicion or cunning. They are relatively insensitive
to pleasure and pain; Montesquieu writes that "you must flay a Muscovite
alive to make him feel" (SL 14.2). Those who live in warm climates have
stronger but less durable sensations. They are more fearful, more amorous, and
more susceptible both to the temptations of pleasure and to real or imagined
pain; but they are less resolute, and less capable of sustained or decisive
action. The manners of those who live in temperate climates are
"inconstant", since "the climate has not a quality determinate
enough to fix them" (SL 14.2). These differences are not hereditary: if
one moves from one sort of climate to another, one's temperament will alter
accordingly.
A hot climate can make slavery comprehensible.
Montesquieu writes that "the state of slavery is in its own nature
bad" (SL 15.1); he is particularly contemptuous of religious and racist
justifications for slavery. However, on his view, there are two types of country
in which slavery, while not acceptable, is less bad than it might otherwise be.
In despotic countries, the situation of slaves is not that different from the
situation of the despot's other subjects; for this reason, slavery in a
despotic state is "more tolerable" (SL 15.1) than in other countries.
In unusually hot countries, it might be that "the excess of heat enervates
the body, and renders men so slothful and dispirited that nothing but the fear
of chastisement can oblige them to perform any laborious duty: slavery is there
more reconcilable to reason" (SL 15.7). However, Montesquieu writes that
when work can be done by freemen motivated by the hope of gain rather than by
slaves motivated by fear, the former will always work better; and that in such climates
slavery is not only wrong but imprudent. He hopes that "there is not that
climate upon earth where the most laborious services might not with proper
encouragement be performed by freemen" (SL 15.8); if there is no such
climate, then slavery could never be justified on these grounds. The quality of
a country's soil also affects the form of its government. Monarchies are more
common where the soil is fertile, and republics where it is barren. This is so
for three reasons. First, those who live in fruitful countries are more apt to
be content with their situation, and to value in a government not the liberty
it bestows but its ability to provide them with enough security that they can
get on with their farming. They are therefore more willing to accept a monarchy
if it can provide such security. Often it can, since monarchies can respond to
threats more quickly than republics. Second, fertile countries are both more
desirable than barren countries and easier to conquer: they "are always of
a level surface, where the inhabitants are unable to dispute against a stronger
power; they are then obliged to submit; and when they have once submitted, the
spirit of liberty cannot return; the wealth of the country is a pledge of their
fidelity" (SL 18.2). Montesquieu believes that monarchies are much more
likely than republics to wage wars of conquest, and therefore that a conquering
power is likely to be a monarchy. Third, those who live where the soil is
barren have to work hard in order to survive; this tends to make them
"industrious, sober, inured to hardship, courageous, and fit for war"
(SL 18.4). Those who inhabit fertile country, by contrast, favor "ease,
effeminacy, and a certain fondness for the preservation of life" (SL
18.4). For this reason, the inhabitants of barren countries are better able to
defend themselves from such attacks as might occur, and to defend their liberty
against those who would destroy it. These facts give barren countries
advantages that compensate for the infertility of their soil. Since they are
less likely to be invaded, they are less likely to be sacked and devastated;
and they are more likely to be worked well, since "countries are not
cultivated in proportion to their fertility, but to their liberty" (SL
18.3). This is why "the best provinces are most frequently depopulated,
while the frightful countries of the North continue always inhabited, from
their being almost uninhabitable" (SL 18.3). Montesquieu believes that the
climate and geography of Asia explain why despotism flourishes there. Asia, he
thinks, has two features that distinguish it from Europe. First, Asia has
virtually no temperate zone. While the mountains of Scandinavia shelter Europe
from arctic winds, Asia has no such buffer; for this reason its frigid northern
zone extends much further south than in Europe, and there is a relatively quick
transition from it to the tropical south. For this reason "the warlike,
brave, and active people touch immediately upon those who are indolent,
effeminate and timorous; the one must, therefore, conquer, and the other be
conquered" (SL 17.3). In Europe, by contrast, the climate changes
gradually from cold to hot; therefore "strong nations are opposed to the
strong; and those who join each other have nearly the same courage" (SL
17.3). Second, Asia has larger plains than Europe. Its mountain ranges lie
further apart, and its rivers are not such formidable barriers to invasion.
Since Europe is naturally divided into smaller regions, it is more difficult
for any one power to conquer them all; this means that Europe will tend to have
more and smaller states. Asia, by contrast, tends to have much larger empires,
which predisposes it to despotism.
IDEA
ON POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Baron de Montesquieu believed that the best government
should be divided amongst three branches. He believed this was the best form of
government so that one person doesn't have all of the power. He thought that
England showed a good model of this because “England divided power between the
king, Parliament, and the judges of the English courts" (rjgeib.com).
Montesquieu named this idea the separation of powers and that is what we have
in the United States. The United States has three equal branches of government,
which are called the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The three
branches ensure a balance of power. Rather than having an autocratic leader,
people must work together in order to accomplish anything. If Montesquieu were
alive today, he would admire our government structure because it consists of
three equal parts. One political leader that he would think highly of would be
our recently elected president, Barack Obama. Barack said during his acceptance
speech, “...each of us can pursue our individual dreams but still come together
as one American family...”. Montesquieu would respect him because Obama will
try to make all branches of the government work together.
Montesquieu argued that the best government would be one in which power
was balanced among three groups of officials. He thought England - which
divided power between the king (who enforced laws), Parliament (which made
laws), and the judges of the English courts (who interpreted laws) - was a good
model of this. Montesquieu called the idea of dividing government power into
three branches the "separation of powers." He thought it most
important to create separate branches of government with equal but different
powers. That way, the government would avoid placing too much power with one
individual or group of individuals. He wrote, "When the [law making] and
[law enforcement] powers are united in the same person... there can be no
liberty." According to Montesquieu, each branch of government could limit
the power of the other two branches. Therefore, no branch of the government
could threaten the freedom of the people. His ideas about separation of powers
became the basis for the United States Constitution.
SUPPORT
Although he was an aristocratic philosophe of the
French Enlightenment, Montesquieu will likely be best remembered for his
tremendous impact on the development of constitutional government, particularly
that of the United States—a country that did not exist at the time of his
death. His doctrine of the separation of powers was a cornerstone of the
American Constitution and a significant contribution to political philosophy.
His research into the effects of geography and culture on the structure of
government provided one of the earliest models of sociology, and his use of
empirical data was an important innovation in the development of political
science. Montesquieu also was capable of humor, satire, and romance in his
writings, and his libertine wit made him welcome in the elite salons of
eighteenth-century Paris, but even in his fiction he demonstrated the serious
and broad-minded intellect evident in his highly influential masterpiece, De
l’esprit des loix (1748; The Spirit of the Laws).
IDEA ON EDUCATION
That the Laws of Education Ought to Be in Relation to
the Principles of Government
1. Of the Laws of Education. The laws of education are
the first impressions we receive; and as they prepare us for civil life, every
private family ought to be governed by the plan of that great household which
comprehends them all.
If the people in general have a principle, their
constituent parts, that is, the several families, will have one also. The laws
of education will be therefore different in each species of government: in
monarchies they will have honour for their object; in republics, virtue; in
despotic governments, fear.
2. Of Education in Monarchies. In monarchies the principal
branch of education is not taught in colleges or academies. It commences, in
some measure, at our setting out in the world; for this is the school of what
we call honour, that universal preceptor which ought everywhere to be our
guide.Here it is that we constantly hear three rules or maxims, viz., that we
should have a certain nobleness in our virtues, a kind of frankness in our
morals, and a particular politeness in our behaviour. The virtues we are here
taught are less what we owe to others than to ourselves; they are not so much
what draws us towards society, as what distinguishes us from our
fellow-citizens. Here the actions of men are judged, not as virtuous, but as
shining; not as just, but as great; not as reasonable, but as extraordinary.
When honour here meets with anything noble in our actions, it is either a judge
that approves them, or sophist by whom they are excused. It allows of gallantry
when united with the idea of sensible affection, or with that of conquest; this
is the reason why we never meet with so strict a purity of morals in monarchies
as in republican governments. It allows of cunning and craft, when joined with
the notion of greatness of soul or importance of affairs; as, for instance, in
politics, with finesses of which it is far from being offended. It does not
forbid adulation, save when separated from the idea of a large fortune, and
connected only with the sense of our mean condition. With regard to morals, I
have observed that the education of monarchies ought to admit of a certain
frankness and open carriage. Truth, therefore, in conversation is here a
necessary point. But is it for the sake of truth? By no means. Truth is
requisite only because a person habituated to veracity has an air of boldness
and freedom. And indeed a man of this stamp seems to lay a stress only on the
things themselves, not on the manner in which they are received. Hence it is
that in proportion as this kind of frankness is commended, that of the common
people is despised, which has nothing but truth and simplicity for its object.
In fine, the education of monarchies requires a
certain politeness of behaviour. Man, a sociable animal, is formed to please in
society; and a person that would break through the rules of decency, so as to
shock those he conversed with, would lose the public esteem, and become
incapable of doing any good. But politeness, generally speaking, does not
derive its origin from so pure a source. It arises from a desire of
distinguishing ourselves. It is pride that renders us polite; we are flattered
with being taken notice of for behaviour that shows we are not of a mean
condition, and that we have not been bred with those who in all ages are
considered the scum of the people. Politeness, in monarchies, is naturalised at
court. One man excessively great renders everybody else little. Hence that
regard which is paid to our fellow-subjects; hence that politeness, equally
pleasing to those by whom, as to those towards whom, it is practised, because
it gives people to understand that a person actually belongs, or at least
deserves to belong, to the court. A courtly air consists in quitting a real for
a borrowed greatness. The latter pleases the courtier more than the former. It
inspires him with a certain disdainful modesty, which shows itself externally,
but whose pride insensibly diminishes in proportion to its distance from the
source of this greatness. At court we find a delicacy of taste in everything —
a delicacy arising from the constant use of the superfluities of life, from the
variety, and especially the satiety, of pleasures, from the multiplicity and
even confusion of fancies, which, if they are but agreeable, are sure of being
well received. These are the things which properly fall within the province of
education, in order to form what we call a man of honour, a man possessed of
all the qualities and virtues requisite in this kind of government. Here it is
that honour interferes with everything, mixing even with people's manner of
thinking, and directing their very principles. To this whimsical honour it is
owing that the virtues are only just what it pleases; it adds rules of its own
invention to everything prescribed to us; it extends or limits our duties
according to its own fancy, whether they proceed from religion, politics, or
morality. There is nothing so strongly inculcated in monarchies, by the laws,
by religion and honour, as submission to the prince's will; but this very
honour tells us that the prince never ought to command a dishonourable action,
because this would render us incapable of serving him.
Crillon refused
to assassinate the Duke of Guise, but offered to fight him. After the massacre
of St. Bartholomew, Charles IX, having sent orders to the governors in the
several provinces for the Huguenots to be murdered, Viscount Dorte, who
commanded at Bayonne, wrote thus to the king:1 "Sire, among the
inhabitants of this town, and your majesty's troops, I could not find so much
as one executioner; they are honest citizens and brave soldiers. We jointly,
therefore, beseech your majesty to command our arms and lives in things that
are practicable." This great and generous soul looked upon a base action
as a thing impossible.
There is nothing that honour more strongly recommends
to the nobility than to serve their prince in a military capacity. And, indeed,
this is their favourite profession, because its dangers, its success, and even
its miscarriages are the road to grandeur. Yet this very law of its own making
honour chooses to explain: and in case of any affront, it requires or permits
us to retire. It insists also that we should be at liberty either to seek or to
reject employments, a liberty which it prefers even to an ample fortune. Honour
therefore has its supreme laws, to which education is obliged to conform.2 The chief
of these are that we are permitted to set a value upon our fortune, but are
absolutely forbidden to set any upon our lives. The second is that, when we are
raised to a post or preferment, we should never do or permit anything which may
seem to imply that we look upon ourselves as inferior to the rank we hold. The
third is that those things which honour forbids are more rigorously forbidden,
when the laws do not concur in the prohibition; and those it commands are more
strongly insisted upon, when they happen not to be commanded by law.
3. Of Education in a Despotic Government. As education
in monarchies tends to raise and ennoble the mind, in despotic governments its
only aim is to debase it. Here it must necessarily be servile; even in power
such an education will be an advantage, because every tyrant is at the same
time a slave. Excessive obedience supposes ignorance in the person that obeys:
the same it supposes in him that commands, for he has no occasion to
deliberate, to doubt, to reason; he has only to will. In despotic states, each
house is a separate government. As education, therefore, consists chieflv in
social converse, it must be here very much limited; all it does is to strike
the heart with fear, and to imprint on the understanding a very simple notion
of a few principles of religion. Learning here proves dangerous, emulation
fatal; and as to virtue, Aristotle3 cannot think that there is any one virtue
belonging to slaves; if so, education in despotic countries is confined within
a very narrow compass.
Here, therefore, education is in some measure
needless: to give something, one must take away everything, and begin with
making a bad subject in order to make a good slave. For why should education
take pains in forming a good citizen, only to make him share in the public
misery? If he loves his country, he will strive to relax the springs of
government; if he miscarries he will be undone; if he succeeds, he must expose
himself, the prince, and his country to ruin.
4. Of Education in a Republican Government. It is in a
republican government that the whole power of education is required. The fear
of despotic governments naturally arises of itself amidst threats and
punishments; the honour of monarchies is favoured by the passions, and favours
them in its turn; but virtue is a self-renunciation, which is ever arduous and
painful. This virtue may be defined as the love of the laws and of our country.
As such love requires a constant preference of public to private interest, it
is the source of all private virtues; for they are nothing more than this very
preference itself. This love is peculiar to democracies. In these alone the
government is entrusted to private citizens. Now a government is like
everything else: to preserve it we must love it. Has it ever been known that
kings were not fond of monarchy, or that despotic princes hated arbitrary
power? Everything therefore depends on establishing this love in a republic;
and to inspire it ought to be the principal business of education: but the
surest way of instilling it into children is for parents to set them an
example. People have it generally in their power to communicate their ideas to
their children; but they are still better able to transfuse their passions. If
it happens otherwise, it is because the impressions made at home are effaced by
those they have received abroad. It is not the young people that degenerate;
they are not spoiled till those of maturer age are already sunk into
corruption.
5. Difference between the Effects of Ancient and
Modern Education. Most of the ancients lived under governments that had virtue
for their principle; and when this was in full vigour they performed actions
unusual in our times, and at which our narrow minds are astonished.
Another advantage their education possessed over ours
was that it never could be effaced by contrary impressions. Epaminondas, the
last year of his life, said, heard, beheld, and performed the very same things
as at the age in which he received the first principles of his education.
In our days we receive three different or contrary
educations, namely, of our parents, of our masters, and of the world. What we
learn in the latter effaces all the ideas of the former. This, in some measure,
arises from the contrast we experience between our religious and worldly
engagements, a thing unknown to the ancients.
IDEA ON COMMERCE
Of all the ways in which a country might seek to
enrich itself, Montesquieu believes, commerce is the only one without
overwhelming drawbacks. Conquering and plundering one's neighbors can provide
temporary infusions of money, but over time the costs of maintaining an
occupying army and administering subjugated peoples impose strains that few
countries can endure. Extracting precious metals from colonial mines leads to
general inflation; thus the costs of extraction increase while the value of the
extracted metals decreases. The increased availability of money furthers the
development of commerce in other countries; however, in the country which
extracts gold and silver, domestic industry is destroyed.
Commerce, by contrast, has no such disadvantages. It
does not require vast armies, or the continued subjugation of other peoples. It
does not undermine itself, as the extraction of gold from colonial mines does,
and it rewards domestic industry. It therefore sustains itself, and nations
which engage in it, over time. While it does not produce all the virtues --
hospitality, Montesquieu thinks, is more often found among the poor than among
commercial peoples -- it does produce some: "the spirit of commerce is
naturally attended with that of frugality, economy, moderation, labor,
prudence, tranquility, order, and rule" (SL 5.6). In addition, it "is
a cure for the most destructive prejudices" (SL 20.1), improves manners,
and leads to peace among nations. In monarchies, Montesquieu believes, the aim
of commerce is, for the most part, to supply luxuries. In republics, it is to
bring from one country what is wanted in another, "gaining little"
but "gaining incessantly" (SL 20.4). In despotisms, there is very
little commerce of any kind, since there is no security of property. In a
monarchy, neither kings nor nobles should engage in commerce, since this would
risk concentrating too much power in their hands. By the same token, there
should be no banks in a monarchy, since a treasure "no sooner becomes
great than it becomes the treasure of the prince" (SL 20.10). In
republics, by contrast, banks are extremely useful, and anyone should be
allowed to engage in trade. Restrictions on which profession a person can
follow destroy people's hopes of bettering their situation; they are therefore
appropriate only to despotic states. While some mercantilists had argued that
commerce is a zero-sum game in which when some gain, others necessarily lose,
Montesquieu believes that commerce benefits all countries except those who have
nothing but their land and what it produces. In those deeply impoverished
countries, commerce with other countries will encourage those who own the land
to oppress those who work it, rather than encouraging the development of
domestic industries and manufacture. However, all other countries benefit by
commerce, and should seek to trade with as many other nations as possible,
"for it is competition which sets a just value on merchandise, and
establishes the relation between them" (SL 20.9). Montesquieu describes
commerce as an activity that cannot be confined or controlled by any individual
government or monarch. This, in his view, has always been true: "Commerce
is sometimes destroyed by conquerors, sometimes cramped by monarchs; it
traverses the earth, flies from the places where it is oppressed, and stays
where it has liberty to breathe" (SL 21.5). However, the independence of
commerce was greatly enhanced when, during the medieval period, Jews responded
to persecution and the seizure of their property by inventing letters of
exchange. "Commerce, by this method, became capable of eluding violence,
and of maintaining everywhere its ground; the richest merchant having none but
invisible effects, which he could convey imperceptibly wherever he
pleased" (SL 21.20). This set in motion developments which made commerce
still more independent of monarchs and their whims. First, it facilitated the
development of international markets, which place prices outside the control of
governments. Money, according to Montesquieu, is "a sign which represents
the value of all merchandise" (SL 22.2). The price of merchandise depends
on the quantity of money and the quantity of merchandise, and on the amounts of
money and merchandise that are in trade. Monarchs can affect this price by
imposing tariffs or duties on certain goods. But since they cannot control the
amounts of money and merchandise that are in trade within their own countries,
let alone internationally, a monarch "can no more fix the price of
merchandise than he can establish by a decree that the relation 1 has to 10 is
equal to that of 1 to 20" (SL 22.7). If a monarch attempts to do so, he
courts disaster: "Julian's lowering the price of provisions at Antioch was
the cause of a most terrible famine" (SL 22.7).
Second, it permitted the development of international
currency exchanges, which place the exchange rate of a country's currency
largely outside the control of that country's government. A monarch can
establish a currency, and stipulate how much of some metal each unit of that
currency shall contain. However, monarchs cannot control the rates of exchange
between their currencies and those of other countries. These rates depend on
the relative scarcity of money in the countries in question, and they are
"fixed by the general opinion of the merchants, never by the decrees of
the prince" (SL 22.10). For this reason "the exchange of all places
constantly tends to a certain proportion, and that in the very nature of
things" (SL 22.10).
Finally, the development of international commerce
gives governments a great incentive to adopt policies that favor, or at least
do not impede, its development. Governments need to maintain confidence in
their creditworthiness if they wish to borrow money; this deters them from at
least the more extreme forms of fiscal irresponsibility, and from oppressing
too greatly those citizens from whom they might later need to borrow money.
Since the development of commerce requires the availability of loans,
governments must establish interest rates high enough to encourage lending, but
not so high as to make borrowing unprofitable. Taxes must not be so high that
they deprive citizens of the hope of bettering their situations (SL 13.2), and
the laws should allow those citizens enough freedom to carry out commercial
affairs.
In general, Montesquieu believes that commerce has had
an extremely beneficial influence on government. Since commerce began to
recover after the development of letters of exchange and the reintroduction of
lending at interest, he writes: it became necessary that princes should govern
with more prudence than they themselves could ever have imagined; for great
exertions of authority were, in the event, found to be impolitic ... We begin
to be cured of Machiavelism, and recover from it every day. More moderation has
become necessary in the councils of princes. What would formerly have been
called a master-stroke in politics would be now, independent of the horror it
might occasion, the greatest imprudence. Happy is it for men that they are in a
situation in which, though their passions prompt them to be wicked, it is,
nevertheless, to their interest to be humane and virtuous. (SL 21.20)
CRITICISM OF MONTESQUIEU
Preliminary
Observations
My object in
undertaking this work, was to examine and reflect on each of the great objects
which had been discussed by Montesquieu; to form my own opinions, to commit
them to writing, and in short, to accomplish a clear and settled judgment upon
them. It was not very long before I perceived, that a collection of these
opinions would form a complete treatise on politics or the social science,
which would be of some value, if the principles were all just and well
digested. After having scrutinized them with all the care that I was capable
of, and reconsidered them well, I resolved to arrange the whole in another
manner, so as to form a didactic work, in which the various subjects should be
disposed in their natural order, consistent with their mutual dependence on
each other, and without any regard to the order pursued by Montesquieu; which
in my opinion is not in every respect the best: but I soon perceived, that if
he had been mistaken in the choice of his order of discussion, I might be much
more likely to deceive myself in attempting a new one, notwithstanding the vast
accumulation of light, during the fifty prodigious years which have intervened
between the period when he gave his labors to his contemporaries, and this at
which I now present the result of my studies to mine. It was plain too, that in
proportion as the order which I should have preferred differed from that of
Montesquieu, the more difficult it would have been for me to discuss his
opinions and establish my own; our paths must cross each other continually; I
should have been forced into a multitude of repetitions, in order to render to
him that justice which properly belongs to him; and I should then find myself
reduced to the unpleasant necessity of appearing in opposition to him, without
my motives being clearly perceived. Under such circumstances, it is
questionable whether my ideas would ever have had the advantage of a sufficient
examination: these considerations determined me to prefer the form I have
adopted of a commentary and review of Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws.
Some future
writer, if my effort be fortunate, may profit by the discussion, in giving a
more perfect treatise on the true principles of laws: it is by such a course, I
think all the sciences ought to proceed; each work commencing with the soundest
opinions already received, and progressively receiving the new lights shed upon
them by experience and investigation. This would be truly following the precept
of Condillac.... proceeding rigorously from the known to the unknown. I have no
other ambition, nor does my situation admit of more, than to contribute my
effort to the progress of social science, the most important of all to the
happiness of man, and that which must necessarily be the last to reach
perfection, because it is the product and the result of all the other sciences.
Positive laws
ought to be consequent of the laws of nature: this is the spirit of laws.
Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws.
Laws in
General
Laws are not,
as Montesquieu has asserted, "necessary relations originating in the
nature of things." A law is not a relation, nor is a relation a law: the
definition is not clear nor satisfactory. The word law has its special and
appropriate sense: this sense is always to be found in the original meaning of
words, and to which recourse must be had in order to their being rightly
understood. Here law means a rule of action, prescribed by an authority
invested with competent power and a right so to do: this last condition is
essential, and when it is not possessed, the rule is no longer a law, but an
arbitrary command, an act of violence and usurpation. This idea of law
comprehends that of a penalty consequent of its infraction, of a tribunal which
determines the penalty, and a physical force to put it into execution: without
these attributes laws are inefficient and illusory.
Such is the
primitive sense of the word law; it was not, nor could it be formed, until
after society had commenced: after which, and when the reciprocal action of
sensible beings upon each other was perceived, when the phenomena of nature and
of reason were discovered, and when it came to be found out, that they operated
in an uniform manner in similar circumstances, it was said that they followed
or obeyed certain laws. These were metaphorically denominated the laws of
nature, being only an expression significant of the manner in which the
phenomena constantly act. Thus with reference to the descent of heavy bodies,
we say that it is the effect of gravitation, one of the laws of nature, that a
heavy body abandoned to itself, falls by an accelerated motion proportionate to
the series of odd numbers, so that the spaces passed through are as the squares
of the times of its movement.
In other
words, we mean to say that this phenomenon takes effect, as if an irresistible
power had so ordained it, under the penalty of inevitable annihilation to the
things subjected to this law of nature. We likewise say, it is the law of
nature, that an animated being must be either in a state of enjoying or
suffering; thereby implying that one or the other sensation takes place in the
individual, through the medium of his perceptions, upon which he forms a
judgment; which is only the consciousness of the individual to the feeling of
pleasure or pain; that in consequence of this judgment, a will and a desire are
produced to obtain or to avoid the operation of those perceptions, and to be
happy or unhappy as the will or desire are gratified, or the contrary; by which
we also imply, that an animated being is so constituted in the order of its
nature, that if it were not susceptible of such perceptions and their
consequent effects, it would then not be what we call an animated being.
Here we behold
what is meant by the laws of nature. There are then laws of nature, which we
cannot change, which we cannot even infringe with impunity; for we are not the
authors of our own being, nor of any thing that surrounds us. Thus if we leave
a heavy body without support we are subject to be crushed by its fall. So if we
do not make provision for the accomplishment of our wishes, or, what will amount
to the same, if we cherish desires that are unattainable, we become unhappy;
this is beyond doubt, the supreme power, the infallible tribunal, the force
irresistible, the inevitable punition, that follows, in which every consequence
arises as if it had been so predetermined.
Now society
makes what we call positive laws, that is laws which are artificial and
conventional, by means of an authority purposely constituted, and with
tribunals and an executive power to inforce them. These laws should be
conformable to the laws of nature, originating in the same source, consequent
of the natural laws, and no wise repugnant thereto; without which consonance,
it is certain that nature will overcome them, that their object will not be
accomplished, and that society must be unhappy. Whence originate the good or
bad qualities of our positive laws, their justice or injustice? The just law is
that which produces good, the unjust that which produces evil.
Justice and
injustice therefore had an existence before any positive law; although it is
only to laws of our own creation we can apply the epithets of just or unjust;
since the laws of nature being simply necessary in the nature of things, it
belongs not to us to question them any more than to act contrary to them.
Unquestionably justice and injustice existed before any of our laws, and had it
not been so we should not have any, because we create nothing. It does not
appertain to us to constitute things conformable or contrary to our nature. We
can ascertain and explain what is right or wrong, only according to our right
or wrong comprehension of it; when we declare that to be just which is not so,
we do not thereby render it just; this is beyond our power; we only declare an
error, and occasion a certain quantity of evil, by maintaining that error with
the power of which we have the disposal: but the law, the eternal truth, which
is opposed thereto, remains unchanged and the same.
But it must be
understood, that what is here said by no means implies, that it is at all times
just to resist an unjust law, or always reasonable to oppose with violence what
is unreasonable. This must depend upon a previous consideration, whether the
violent resistance would not cause more evil than passive compliance: this
however is but a secondary question, always dependent on circumstances, the
nature of which will be discussed in the sequel.... we are yet a great way in
the rear of that subject. It is sufficient that the laws of nature exist
anterior and superior to human laws; that fundamental justice is that only
which is conformable to the laws of nature; and that radical injustice is that
which is contrary to the laws of nature; and consequently that our posterior
and consequent laws should be in unison with those more ancient and inevitable laws.
This is the true spirit, or genuine sense, in which all positive laws ought to
be established. But this foundation of the laws is not very easily explained or
understood: the space between the first principles and the ultimate result is
immense. The progressive series of consequences flowing out of the first
principles are the proper subject of a treatise on the spirit of laws, which
should be perspicuously pointed out, and its maxims modified to the particular
circumstances and organization of society. We shall now proceed to examine
these different principles.
LAWS ORIGINATING DIRECTLY FROM THE
NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT
There are only
two kinds of government: those founded on the general rights of man, and those
founded on particular rights.
Spirit of
Laws, Book II.
The ordinary
division of governments into republican, monarchical, and despotic, appears to
me essentially erroneous.
The word
republican is itself a very vague term, comprehending in it a multitude of
forms of government very different from each other: from the peaceable
democracy of Schwitz, the turbulent mixed government of Athens, to the
concentrated aristocracy of Berne, and the gloomy oligarchy of Venice. Moreover
the term republic cannot be contrasted with that of monarchy, for the United
Provinces of Holland, and the United States of America, have each a single
chief magistrate, and are yet considered republics; beside, that it has always
been uncertain whether we should say the kingdom or republic of Poland.
The word
monarchy properly designates a government in which the executive power is
vested in a single person: though this is only a circumstance which may be
connected with others of a very different nature, and which is not essentially
characteristic of the social organization. What we have said of Poland,
Holland, and the American government, confirms this; to these Sweden and Great
Britain may be added, which in many respects are regal aristocracies. The
Germanic body might also be cited, which with much reason has been often called
a republic of sovereign princes: and even the ancient government of France; for
those perfectly acquainted with it, know that it was properly an ecclesiastical
and feudal aristocracy.... a government of the gown and sword.
The word
despotic implies an abuse; a vice more or less to be met with in all
governments, for all human institutions are, like their authors, imperfect: but
it is not the name of any particular form of society or government. Despotism,
oppression, or abuse of power, takes place whenever the established laws are
without force, or when they give way to the illegal authority of one or several
men. This may be every where perceived from time to time. In many countries men
have been either not sufficiently prudent or too ignorant to take precautions
against this evil; in others the means adopted have proved insufficient; but in
no place has it been established as a principle, that it should be so, not even
in the East: there is then no government which in its actual nature can be called
despotic.
If there were
such a government in the world, it would be that of Denmark; where the nation,
after having shaken off the yoke of the priests and nobles, and fearing their
influence in the assembly, if again convened, requested the king to govern
alone and of himself, confiding to him the care of making such laws as he might
judge necessary for the good of the state: since which period he has never been
called upon to give an account of this discretionary power. Nevertheless this
government, so unlimited in its legislation, has been so moderately conducted,
that it cannot with propriety be said to be despotic, for it has never been
contemplated even to restrain its authority. Yet notwithstanding this
moderation, many persons have continued to consider Denmark as a despotic
state.
THE LAWS
RELATING TO EDUCATION, SHOULD BE CONGENIAL WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
GOVERNMENT.↩
Those
governments which are founded on reason, can alone desire that education should
he exempt from prejudice.... profound and general.
Spirit of
Laws, Book IV.
The title of
this book, is the declaration of a great truth, which is founded on another, no
less true, which may be expressed in these terms: government is like every
thing else, to preserve it you must love it. Our education, therefore, ought to
instil into us sentiments and opinions in unison with the established
institutions, without which we may become desirous of overturning them: now we
all receive three kinds of education.... from our parents.... from our teachers....
and from the world. All three, to act properly, should tend to a common end.
These sentiments are correct, but they comprise all the utility which is to be
found in this book of Montesquieu; who declares, that in despotic states the
children are habituated to servility; that in monarchies, at least among
courtiers, a refined politeness, a delicate taste, an artificial sensibility of
which vanity is the principal cause, are contracted; but he does not inform us
how education disposes them to acquire these qualities, nor which of them are
common to the rest of the nation.
To what he
calls the republican government he gives as its principle self denial, which he
says, is a principal thing. In consequence he manifests for many of the
institutions of the ancients, considered with regard to education, an
admiration in which I cannot participate: I am much surprized to see this in a
man who has reflected so much: the strength of first impressions must have been
very great on his mind, and is an exemplification of the importance of a
correct elementary education.
Montesquieu
informs us, that in reserving to himself the right of judging on the different
forms of political society, he only notices in laws what appears favorable or
unfavorable to each of the several forms. He then reduces them all into three
kinds, despotic, monarchical, and republican; the last of which he subdivides
into two species, democratic and aristocratic, describing the democratic as
essentially republican; after which he describes the despotic government as
abominable and absurd, and precluding all laws: the republican, by which is
understood the democratic government, he describes as insupportable and almost
as absurd; at the same time that he expresses the greatest admiration of the principles
of this form of government: whence it follows, that the aristocracy under
several chiefs, to which however under the name of moderation he attributes so
many vices, and the aristocracy under a single chief, which he calls monarchy,
and to which under the appellation of honor he imputes a still greater portion
of vices, are the only forms which meet his approbation: indeed these two are
the only kinds among those he describes, which he says are not absolutely
against nature.
Without having
recourse to those violent and arbitrary acts, too much admired in certain
ancient institutions, and which, like every thing founded on fanatacism, or
enthusiasm, can have but a temporary duration, governments possess a multitude
of means, by which they may direct every kind of education so as to conform to
their views.
With these
views he ought above all things to call to his view, religious ideas, which
taking possession of the mind from the cradle, make durable and deep
impressions, form habits, and fix opinions, long before the age of reflexion;
nevertheless he should take care previously to attach the priesthood to his
interests, by making them dependant upon his favor; otherwise they being the
propagators of those ideas, may employ them to their exclusive benefit,
establish an interest in the state hostile to his, and form a source of
distraction instead of a means of stability
Here we may
perceive, that an aristocracy, with regard to the education of the people,
ought to act like a monarchical government; though it is not the same, with
respect to the superior order of society; for in an aristocracy, the governing
body requires, that its members should obtain instruction, as solid and
profound as possible; a disposition to study, an aptitude for business, a capacity
for reflection, a temper disposed to circumspection and prudence, even in its
amusements; grave and even simple manners, at least in appearance, and as much
as the national spirit requires. The nobles ought to be perfectly acquainted
with the human mind, the interests of different conditions, and a knowlege of
human affairs at large, were it only to be prepared to counteract them, when
brought in hostility to their body.
This, I
believe, is nearly all we have to say of aristocratical governments in regard
to education. To pursue with exactness all the parts of the classification
which I have adopted, and complete what concerns the class of governments,
which I denominate special, I should now treat of that democracy, which is
established on particular rights and stipulations, but of which I shall now say
nothing; nor of the pure or simple democracy, which is founded on the rights of
the nation, these two conditions of society, being almost imaginary; nor could
they exist but among an uncivilized people, where no attention can be paid to
education of any kind; and indeed to perpetuate such a state, all education,
properly so called, should forever be banished.
LAWS THAT ESTABLISH POLITICAL LIBERTY
IN RELATION TO THE CITIZEN.↩
Political
liberty cannot exist without individual liberty, and that of the press.... nor
this without trial by jury.
Spirit of
Laws, Book XII.
The book
preceding, Montesquieu entitles.... Of laws establishing political liberty in
relation to the constitution. We have seen that, under this title, he treats of
the effects which the laws forming the constitution of a state, produce on the
liberty of man; that is to say.... which regulate the distribution of political
power. These laws, in effect, contain the principles of those which affect the
general interests of society, and by combining them with those which regulate
the public economy, that is those which govern the formation and distribution
of wealth, we shall be in possession of the whole code by which the aggregate
interests of the political body are regulated, and by which the happiness and
liberty of each is influenced, and thence the happiness and liberty of the
whole.
The question
here is, what are the laws which directly concern each citizen in his private
interests? It is no longer public and political liberty it attacks, or
immediately protects, it is individual and particular liberty. It will be
perceived, that this second species of liberty is very necessary to the first,
and intimately connected with it; because every citizen should be secure
against oppression in his person and goods, in order to be able to defend
political liberty: and it is very evident that if any authority, for example,
should be possessed of the right of inflicting imprisonment, banishment, or fines,
it would be impracticable to restrain it within the bounds that may be
prescribed to it by the constitution of the state, if it has a constitution
very exact and formal. Montesquieu also says.... that under the consideration
in question, liberty consists in security, and that the constitution may be
free.... that is, it may contain clauses favorable to liberty.... while the
citizens do not really enjoy liberty; and he adds, with much reason, that in
most states.... he might have said in all.... individual liberty is more
restrained, violated, and kept down, than the constitution authorises or
requires. The reason is, that the functionaries, always desirous of going
beyond the bounds of law, instead of regarding them, find it necessary to check
and repress political liberty, in order to keep down individual liberty. As
principles the constitutional laws, and in operation the administrative laws,
influence general liberty, so criminal and civil laws dispose of civil liberty.
The subject we are treating of belongs almost entirely to the sixth book, where
Montesquieu proposed examining the consequences and principles of different
governments, in relation to the simplicity of criminal laws, the forms of
judgment, and the infliction of punishment. A better method of distribution and
connexion of ideas, would have united that book with this, and even with the
twenty-ninth, which treats of the manner of composing laws, and at the same
time to appreciate their effects; but we must follow the order adopted by our author:
any one so disposed, would do well to new model both his work and ours, and
form for himself a connected and complete system of principles.
CLIMATE AND SOCIETY CRITICS
In the first
place I shall observe, that to form a just idea of climate, we must understand
by this word, the aggregate of all the circumstances which form the physical
constitution of a country: now this is not what Montesquieu has done; he
appears to consider nothing else than the degree of latitude and the degree of
heat: but it is not in these facts alone, that the difference of climate
consists.
In the next
place I must remark, that if there be no doubt that the climate has a great
influence over every living creature.... even over our vegetables, and
consequently on man, it is nevertheless true, that it has less effect on man
than any other animal; the proof is, that man not only inhabits every climate,
but can accommodate himself to them all, in all positions, and under all
circumstances; the reason whereof is to be found in the extent of his
intellectual faculties, which, by exciting in him other wants, render him less
dependant on those purely physical, and in the multitude of arts by which he
contrives to provide for these different necessities; to which must be added,
that the more variously and actively his faculties are employed, the more are
these arts multiplied and improved. In other words, the more man becomes
civilized, the less is the influence of climate upon him. I believe, therefore,
that Montesquieu has not perceived all the causes of the influence of climate,
and that he has exaggerated its effects: I may even venture to say, that he has
endeavored to prove it by many doubtful anecdotes, and false or frivolous
narratives, some of which are even very ridiculous.
After these
preliminaries, he considers the influence of climate, as a cause of the use of
slaves, which he denominates civil slavery.... and the slavery of women, he
calls domestic slavery.... and to the oppression of the citizens, he gives the
title of political servitude; these are in effect, three particulars very
important in considering the state of society.
But after
having first very energetically represented the use of slaves, as an abominable,
iniquitous, and atrocious thing, which corrupts the oppressor more than the
oppressed, and for whom it is impossible to form any reasonable laws, he
himself acknowleges that no climate requires, nor absolutely could require,
such excess of deprivation; and that in fact slavery has existed in the frozen
marshes of Germany, and may be dispensed with in the Torrid Zone: it must not
then be attributed to climate, but to the ferocity and stupidity of mete.
In conclusion
Montesquieu was one of the great political philosophers of
the Enlightenment. Insatiably curious and mordantly funny, he constructed a
naturalistic account of the various forms of government, and of the causes that
made them what they were and that advanced or constrained their development. He
used this account to explain how governments might be preserved from
corruption. He saw despotism, in particular, as a standing danger for any
government not already despotic, and argued that it could best be prevented by
a system in which different bodies exercised legislative, executive, and
judicial power, and in which all those bodies were bound by the rule of law.
This theory of the separation of powers had an enormous impact on liberal
political theory, and on the framers of the constitution of the United States
of America.
REFERENCE
Œuvres Complètes, 2 volumes, Roger Callois (ed.), Paris:
Editions Gallimard, 1949.
Persian Letters, C. J. Betts (trans.), Harmondsworth, UK:
Penguin Books, 1973.
Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans
and Their Decline, David Lowenthal (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999.
The Spirit of the Laws, Thomas Nugent (trans.), New York:
MacMillan, 1949.
Life
Shackleton, Robert, 1961, Montesquieu: A Critical Biography,
London: Oxford University Press.
Kingston, Rebecca, 1996, Montesquieu and the Parlement of
Bordeaux, Geneva: Librairie Droz.
Selected Secondary Literature
Berlin, Isaiah, 2001, “Montesquieu”, in Against the Current,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Carrithers, D., Mosher, M., and Rahe, P. (eds.), 2001,
Montesquieu's Science of Politics: Essays on The Spirit of the Laws, Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Cohler, Anne, 1988, Montesquieu's Comparative Politics and
the Spirit of American Constitutionalism, Lawrence KS: University of Kansas
Press.
Conroy, Peter, 1992, Montesquieu Revisited, New York: Twayne
Publishers.
Cox, Iris, 1983, Montesquieu and the History of French Laws,
Oxford: Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institution.
Durkheim, Emile, 1960, Montesquieu and Rouseau: Forerunners
of Sociology, Ann Arbor: University of Michign Press.
Hulliung, Mark, 1976, Montesquieu and the Old Régime,
Berkeley: University of California Press
Keohane, Nannerl, 1980, Philosophy and the State in France:
The Renaissance to the Enlightenment, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Krause, Sharon, 1999, “The Politics of Distinction and
Disobedience: Honor and the Defense of Liberty in Montesquieu”, Polity, 31 (3):
469-499.
Oakeshott, Michael, 1993, “The Investigation of the
‘Character’ of Modern Politics”, in Morality and Politics in Modern Europe: The
Harvard Lectures, Shirley Letwin (ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press.
Pangle, Thomas, 1973, Montesquieu's Philosophy of
Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Shklar, Judith, 1998, “Montesquieu and the New
Republicanism”, in Political Thought and Political Thinkers, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Other Internet Resources
eText of The Spirit of the Laws, maintained by The
Constitution Society, a private non-profit organization dedicated to research
and public education on the principles of constitutional republican government.
eText of Montesquieu's Essai sur le Goût (in French).